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THE RIGHT TO FLOURISH,
REGENERATE, AND EVOLVE:
TOWARDS JURIDICAL PERSONHOOD
FOR AN ECOSYSTEM
NICHOLAS BILOF 1
I. INTRODUCTION: THE RIVER THAT OOZED RATHER THAN FLOWED
On June 22, 1969, the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland ignited into
flames as a passing train spattered sparks into its water. When TIME
magazine published photos of the Cuyahoga burning alongside a story
that described the river as “so saturated with sewage and industrial waste
that it ‘oozes rather than flows,’” concern erupted across the country.2 In
retrospect a half-century later, TIME noted that “the flaming Cuyahoga
became a figurehead for America’s mounting environmental issues and
sparked wide-ranging reforms, including the passage of the Clean Water
Act and the creation of federal and state environmental protection
agencies.”3
Because of its public role as the symbol of a movement of environ-
mental reform, the Cuyahoga received rehabilitating treatment and re-
sources, and was ultimately declared “fireproof” on the twentieth
anniversary of the blaze.4 Once no longer flammable, even if it still was
not sparkling clean, biologists found several species of insects, fish, and
other organisms that had disappeared from the Cuyahoga had now re-
turned and were “flourishing.”5
1 Nicholas Bilof is a 2L at Golden Gate University School of Law. He is expected to graduate
in May 2019.
2 Jennifer Latson, The Burning River that Sparked a Revolution, TIME MAG. (June 22, 2015)
http://time.com/3921976/cuyahoga-fire/.
3 Id.
4 Doron P. Levin, River Not Yet Clean, but It’s Fireproof, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 1989) http://
www.nytimes.com/1989/06/25/us/river-not-yet-clean-but-it-s-fireproof.html.
5 Id.
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But the Cuyahoga is exceptional: approximately forty percent of the
rivers and lakes in the United States, as surveyed by the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA), are too polluted for swimming and
fishing.6 Water pollution has many causes, but most often results from
fertilizer run-off and industrial wastewater discharges.7 Meanwhile, in
many places across America water supplies are straining to meet ever-
increasing demands; diversions of water to support cities, agriculture,
and industrial uses have significantly altered the natural character of
many waterways and their surrounding habitats, jeopardizing the sus-
tainability of rivers, lakes, and other crucial, interconnected ecosystems.8
Inevitably, the use of water for almost all human activities results in
the deterioration of its quality and generally limits its further potential
use.9 For that reason, it is necessary to protect the nation’s waterways
from exploitative and destructive human practices. But half a century
after the river that oozed and burned sparked a national movement giving
rise to a host of environmental protection agencies and regulations, most
rivers and lakes in the U.S. are still more polluted and over-tapped than
ever. Because governments and the legal system have failed to safeguard
America’s waterways, a crucial evolution in legal consciousness is
needed.
With that end in mind, this article will examine two at-risk Ameri-
can rivers through a comparison of the different legal approaches brought
by the citizens and conservation groups fighting to protect them.
Through analysis of the two lawsuits, this article will highlight the flaws
of the traditional approach, and introduce a novel proposal for a shift in
the lens under which nature is considered in American jurisprudence.
Part I will survey the Suwannee River and a citizen suit against a
poultry-packing plant accused of illegally fouling its waters through re-
peated violations of an EPA-issued permit governing wastewater dis-
charges. This suit represents the congressionally-created traditional
avenue to protecting a natural object when government agencies are una-
ble or unwilling to enforce environmental regulations.
6 Why is Our Water in Trouble?, THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, https://www.nature.org/ourin-
itiatives/habitats/riverslakes/threatsimpacts/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2018).
7 Id; see also Environment America Research & Policy Center, Corporate Agribusiness and
the Fouling of America’s Waterways, ENV’T AMERICA, http://www.environmentamerica.org/reports/
ame/corporate-agribusiness-and-fouling-americas-waterways?_ga=2.70661520.1050170889.150631
0806-342562671.1506310806 (last visited Jan. 14, 2018).
8 Protect Ecosystems and Fisheries, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNS., https://www.nrdc.org/
issues/protect-ecosystems-and-fisheries (last visited Jan. 14, 2018).
9 Water Quality Monitoring: Chapter 2 - Water Quality, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 18 (Jamie
Bartram and Richard Balance, eds.) http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/resourcesquality/
wqmchap2.pdf.
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Part II will present the Colorado River and a unique suit, which
builds upon dusty law review pages and an old Supreme Court Justice’s
dissent in an attempt to establish juridical personhood for a river ecosys-
tem. This case of first impression aims to establish a new legal doctrine
that would significantly loosen the standing requirements for citizens
seeking to sue for the protection of inanimate, natural objects—by al-
lowing the suit to be brought in the name of the aggrieved ecosystem
itself. The court’s declaration of the ecosystem as a legal person is the
necessary first step towards the recognition of the ecosystem’s funda-
mental rights, and an ultimate remedy against the state and governor for
the violation of those rights.
Part III will consummate the comparison of approaches brought by
the two suits through argument positing why an evolution in the con-
sciousness of American jurisprudence is necessary and desirable. Be-
cause the governments and laws of the United States have failed to
protect the ecosystems within its jurisdiction, Nature needs a voice to
litigate for its own preservation.
II. THE SUWANNEE
The headwaters of the Suwannee River descend from an elevation
of approximately 120 feet above sea level.10 In total, the Suwannee’s
course runs about 250 miles, all but thirty-five of which are within the
State of Florida.11 Although its flow churns at an average speed of four
miles per hour, transitions in geography create noticeable differences,
dividing the Suwannee into its Upper, Middle, and Lower sections.12 The
Upper Suwannee is lined with steep limestone banks that hasten its flow
and create rare Florida “whitewater.”13 The Middle section’s “sloping
sand banks retain the footprints of turkey, deer and other animals that
drink from the river.”14 About fifty miles downstream, near the city of
Fanning Springs, the Lower Suwannee serves as a fish habitat and a
home to other species, like bluegill, redear sunfish, channel catfish, and
10 The Suwannee River, SAVE OUR SUWANNEE, http://www.saveoursuwannee.org/suwannee-
region/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2018).
11 Suwannee River, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/place/Suwannee
-River (last visited Jan. 14, 2018).
12 SAVE OUR SUWANNEE, supra note 10.
13 Id.
14 Suwannee River, GEORGIA RIVER NETWORK, https://garivers.org/other-georgia-rivers/
suwannee-river.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2018).
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both redbreast and spotted sunfish.15 Many consider the Suwannee River
to be one of Florida’s most important waterways.16
Beyond the Suwannee River itself is its watershed, or basin, which
covers almost ten thousand square miles.17 The Suwannee Basin is a di-
verse ecosystem, and this diversity contributes to the importance of its
ecology: the watershed is made up of three separate but interconnected
hydrologic landscape units, each supporting an abundance of animal,
plant, and human life.18 The Suwannee River Basin is the largest free-
flowing source of freshwater to the Gulf of Mexico.19
But the Basin faces supply-anxieties as more people, more wells,
larger wells, and increasingly-intensive agriculture practices have re-
sulted in persistently increasing withdrawals.20 Additionally, the relative
abundance of water resources in the Suwannee Basin makes it a target
for nearby localities; particularly of concern is “the envious look north-
ward from the water-exhausted Tampa Bay area.”21
A. THE WATERS’ QUALITY
Compared to most of the major rivers in the United States, the
Suwannee’s flow is “relatively unimpaired [in terms of] water quality.”22
It has been called “the only major waterway in the southeastern United
States that is still unspoiled.”23 It is designated as one of twelve National
Showcase Watersheds.24 Significant portions of its basin are permanently
protected under the ownership of federal and state governments.25 In the
15 SAVE OUR SUWANNEE, supra note 10.
16 Plaintiff’s Complaint at 3, Env’t Am. v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., (2017) (No. 3:17-cv-00272-
TJC-JRK).
17 Suwannee River Watershed: Preserving the Georgia/Florida Connection, U.S. FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERVICE https://www.fws.gov/northflorida/Documents/NFL_Suwanee_factsheet.pdf (last
visited Jan. 14, 2018).
18 The Suwannee River: A Coastal Plain Watershed in Transition 3 (last visited Jan. 14,
2018), http://users.clas.ufl.edu/jbmartin/Prospectus.pdf; see also The Suwannee River Basin Pilot
Study: Issues for Watershed Management in Florida https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/FS-080-96/ (last visited
Jan. 14, 2018).
19 Mary M. Davis and David W. Hicks Water Resources of the Upper Suwannee River Water-
shed 70, http://gwri.gatech.edu/sites/default/files/files/docs/2001/DavisM-01.pdf (last visited Jan.
14, 2018).
20 SAVE OUR SUWANNEE, supra note 10.
21 SAVE OUR SUWANNEE, supra note 10.
22 The Suwannee River: A Coastal Plain Watershed in Transition, supra note 18, at 1.
23 The Suwannee River, EXPLORING FLORIDA, https://fcit.usf.edu/florida/lessons/suwannee/
suwannee.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2018).
24 The Suwannee River: A Coastal Plain Watershed in Transition, supra note 18, at 1.
25 Suwannee River Watershed: Preserving the Georgia/Florida Connection U.S. FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/northflorida/Documents/NFL_Suwanee_factsheet.pdf (last
visited Jan. 14, 2018).
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mid-1970’s, the U.S. Department of the Interior recommended that the
Suwannee be added to the National Wild and Scenic River System to
protect the river from depletion and contamination.26 Although there are
several industrial plants that release effluent into the Suwannee’s water-
shed, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regu-
lates industrial discharges by issuing permits through the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).27
B. NPDES PROTECTION
The Clean Water Act (CWA) prohibits the discharge of any pollu-
tant by any person—except those discharges “in compliance with law.”28
To discharge a pollutant, or any combination of pollutants “lawfully,” the
EPA Administrator must issue an NPDES permit.29 The Administrator
may issue a permit “after opportunity” for public hearing,30 and therein
prescribe conditions on what can be discharged, as well as monitoring
and reporting requirements, and other provisions “to ensure that the dis-
charge does not hurt water quality or people’s health.”31 According to the
EPA, “[a]s long as the wastewater being discharged is covered by and in
compliance with an NPDES permit, there are enough controls in place to
make sure the discharge is safe and that humans and aquatic life are
being protected.”32 There are several NPDES permit-holders along the
Suwannee’s route; one of which is a plant owned by a large corporation
called Pilgrim’s Pride.
C. PILGRIM’S PRIDE
As part of JBS USA Holdings, Inc.,33 Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation is
the second-largest chicken producer in the world.34 Pilgrim’s operates a
processing plant in Live Oak, Florida, where chickens are born, raised,
26 GEORGIA RIVER NETWORK, supra note 14.
27 NPDES Permit Basics, National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) UNITED
STATES ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-permit-basics (last visited
Jan. 14, 2018).
28 33 U.S.C. § 1311.
29 See generally 33 U.S.C § 1342.
30 33 U.S.C § 1342(1).
31 What is an NPDES permit?, U. S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY supra note 27; see 33
U.S.C. § 1342(2).
32 Is it legal to have. . ., U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 27.
33 JBS USA is a wholly owned subsidiary of JBS S.A., a Brazilian company that is the
world’s largest processor of fresh beef and pork, with more than US $40 billion in annual sales as of
2012. About JBS JBS SA,  https://jbssa.com/about/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2018).
34 About Us PILGRIM’S PRIDE, http://www.pilgrims.com/our-company/about-us.aspx (last vis-
ited Jan. 14, 2018).
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“slaughtered, bled, scalded, de-feathered, eviscerated, cut up, deboned,
and packed at the plant.”35 The Live Oak plant is less than one mile from
Suwannee River State Park.36 For more than five years, Pilgrim’s has
held an NPDES permit allowing it to discharge a limited amount of was-
tewater into the Suwannee.37 That permit was issued by the Florida De-
partment of Environmental Protection (FDEP), which was delegated
authority to issue NPDES permits by the EPA.38
The FDEP has also designated the Suwannee River as “Special Wa-
ters” of the Outstanding Florida Waters.39 Under Rule 62-302.700(1) of
the Florida Administrative Code, the department’s policy is “to afford
the highest protection to Outstanding Florida Waters.”40 A state water
will be given this designation after a finding that “the waters are of ex-
ceptional recreational or ecological significance and a finding that the
environmental, social, and economic benefits of the designation out-
weigh the environmental, social, and economic costs.”41
In April 2015, the FDEP found that the Pilgrim’s plant in Live Oak
had been violating the limits for toxicity set out in its NPDES permit
from February 2013 to December 2014.42 The FDEP released an order
requiring Pilgrim’s to take “corrective actions” in response to its
“chronic toxicity violations.”43 Yet, in a memo dated February 3, 2017,
an FDEP Wastewater Inspector wrote that there were “significant non-
compliance issues” at the plant, and that Pilgrim’s “is still having issues
with meeting the permit limits.”44 Since its NPDES permit was issued,
the Pilgrim’s plant at Live Oak has discharged millions of gallons of
wastewater into the Suwannee river.45 Neither the federal government
nor the State of Florida have effectively prevented Pilgrim’s from violat-
ing the Clean Water Act (CWA or the Act).46
35 Andrew Caplan, Pilgrim’s Pride sued over wastewater in river, GAINESVILLE SUN
(Mar 9, 2017 6:42 PM) http://www.gainesville.com/news/20170309/pilgrims-pride-sued-over-waste-
water-in-river; Pilgrim’s Complaint, supra note 16, at 1.
36 Caplan, supra note 35.
37 Pilgrim’s Complaint, supra note 16, at 2.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 40.
40 Special Protection, Outstanding Florida Waters, Outstanding National Resource Waters,
Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 62-302.700.
41 FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. 62-302.700(5).
42 Pilgrim’s Complaint, supra note 16, at 20.
43 Id. (quoting FDEP 2015 Consent Order w/ Pilgrims, April 2015)
44 Id. at 3.
45 Caplan, supra note 35.
46 Pilgrim’s Complaint, supra note 16, at 3; 33 U.S.C. §1251 et seq. (1972).
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D. WHO WILL PROTECT THE RIVER WHEN THE GOVERNMENT HAS
FAILED TO?
A citizen suit provision in the CWA allows citizens to sue any per-
son who is alleged to have violated (a) an effluent standard or limitation,
like those of an NPDES permit; or (b) an order issued by the Administra-
tor or a state relating to such a standard or limitation.47 This provision is
designed to include citizens in the enforcement of environmental protec-
tion and to serve as a check on the government. The provision also per-
mits any citizen to sue the agency alleging that the Administrator has
failed to fulfill any duty under the Act “which is not discretionary.”48
Consequently, a group of citizens and environmental groups filed
suit against Pilgrim’s in U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Florida.49 The suit alleges that Pilgrim’s has violated the CWA for 1,377
consecutive days (almost four years).50 The plaintiffs claim to have no-
ticed algal blooms—toxic to humans, animals and plant life—in the
Suwannee downstream from the Pilgrim’s plant.51
Algal blooms occur when nitrogen and phosphorous, most often
coming from agricultural fertilizer runoff and wastewater, enter an
aquatic environment.52 Such deleterious effects are not unknown to the
EPA: by its own report, “agriculture is the leading cause of pollution in
more than 145,000 miles of rivers and streams; one million acres of
lakes, reservoirs and ponds; and 3,000 square miles of bays and estuaries
in the United States.”53 According to the EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory,
which tracks the management of certain toxic chemicals through industry
self-reporting, “JBS facilities (including Pilgrim’s) dumped more than
37.6 million pounds of toxic pollutants into American waterways from
2010 to 2014.”54 Although some of these reported discharges may have
been self-reported “exceedances” of NPDES permit limits, most of these
47 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(a)(1), (f).
48 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2).
49 See generally Pilgrim’s Complaint, supra note 16.
50 Caplan, supra note 35.
51 Pilgrim’s Complaint, supra note 16, at 41; see generally Jane J. Lee, Pea Soup, Pictures:
Extreme Algae Blooms Expanding Worldwide, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC (April 24, 2013) https://
news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/04/pictures/130423-extreme-algae-bloom-fertilizer-lake-
erie-science/.
52 Lee, Plant Food, supra note 51.
53 Environment America Research & Policy Center, Corporate Agribusiness and the Fouling
of America’s Waterways, ENV’T AMERICA 7 (June 29, 2016), http://www.environmentamerica.org/
reports/ame/corporate-agribusiness-and-fouling-americas-waterways?_ga=2.70661520.1050170889
.1506310806-342562671.1506310806.
54 Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) Program, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www
.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-tri-program/learn-about-toxics-release-inventory#What%20is%20
the%20Toxics%20Release%20Inventory; ENV’T AMERICA, supra note 53, at 21.
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pollutants, which were purposely released into natural waterways, are
lawfully permitted by both federal and state governments.55
E. REMEDIES
In the suit against Pilgrim’s for its Live Oak plant’s alleged NPDES
violations, the plaintiffs seek: (a) a declaration of Pilgrim’s violations of
the CWA and NPDES permit; (b) a determination of the number of days
Pilgrim’s has violated; (c) an order to comply with the CWA and NPDES
permit, and to refrain from further violations; (d) an order to implement
remedial, mitigation, or offset measures; (e) an assessment of civil penal-
ties against Pilgrim for each day of violations; (f) an award for the costs
of litigation; and (g) any other relief the Court deems necessary.56 Much
of the relief sought is declaratory and injunctive. The declaratory find-
ings of parts (a) and (b) are prerequisite to any injunctive or civil relief
that can be granted.
Under the CWA, if the Administrator finds that a violation has oc-
curred, notice must be given to the violator in addition to the local state
government. If neither violator nor state government respond suffi-
ciently, the Administrator should issue a compliance order.57 The Ad-
ministrator may bring civil action against a violator “for appropriate
relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction.”58
The CWA also authorizes criminal penalties for negligent and reck-
less violations, in addition to false statements in reporting and tampering
with monitoring equipment.59 Civil penalties are also available, up to
$25,000 per day for each violation.60 When determining the amount of a
civil penalty, a court will consider a variety of factors, including: (i) the
seriousness of the violation; (ii) any economic benefit that resulted from
the violation; (iii) any history of other violations; (iv) any good faith
efforts to comply; (v) the economic impact of the penalty on the violator;
and (vi) “such other matters as justice may require.”61
As the statutory provisions demonstrate, the federal government has
a variety of options to address violations of the CWA. However, the
“vast majority” of the EPA’s enforcement is executed through adminis-
55 33 U.S.C. § 1311.
56 Pilgrim’s Complaint, supra note 16, at 42.
57 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a).
58 33. U.S.C. § 1319(b).
59 33. U.S.C. § 1319(c).
60 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d).
61 Id.
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trative action.62 In practice, when the government does bring civil action
to enforce environmental protections, the strength of the penalties author-
ized by the CWA are often not employed effusively.
For example, in a 1999 case from the Fourth Circuit, defendant
Smithfield Foods, Inc. owned and operated two slaughterhouses that dis-
charged wastewater into Virginia’s Pagan River.63 Smithfield had been
granted NPDES permits, but was accused of violating the wastewater
limits imposed by the permits for a period of over five consecutive
years.64 Although the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality had
evidence of “Smithfield’s numerous CWA violations,” the EPA eventu-
ally realized that the State of Virginia “did not intend to initiate legal
action against Smithfield.”65
When the EPA finally sued in the Eastern District of Virginia, “the
district court found Smithfield liable for 6,982 days (19 years) of viola-
tions.”66 Under the civil penalties provision of the CWA, Smithfield’s
liability for the violations set a maximum penalty of $174.55 million.67
Applying the § 1319(d) factors, the district court found that “the viola-
tions were serious, the company had a history of noncompliance, its fi-
nancial status was healthy, and good-faith efforts to comply with the law
were minimal.”68 The district court evaluated the economic benefit to
Smithfield from its violations at $4.2 million, and imposed penalty of
$12.6 million, only about seven percent of the statutory maximum.69 The
Court of Appeals reviewed “the highly discretionary calculations” of the
district court under an abuse of discretion standard and remanded for a
recalculation of the penalties.70 Ultimately, the penalty was reduced to
$12.4 million.71 Despite further charges that the chief operator of Smith-
field’s wastewater treatment plant had falsified reports and destroyed
records, no criminal penalties were ordered.72
While this case serves as an example of federal government en-
forcement of environmental protections through civil penalties, the EPA
62 Jennifer Cornejo and Jordan Rodriguez, Clean Water Act Section 404 Enforcement 2,
https://www.velaw.com/UploadedFiles/VEsite/Presentations/CWASection404Enforcement.pdf (last
visited Mar. 19, 2018).
63 U.S. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 191 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 1999).
64 Id.
65 Id. at 522.
66 Id. at 523.
67 Id. at 529.
68 Cornejo et al., supra note 62, at 7.
69 Id.
70 Smithfield, 191 F.3d at 532.
71 Cornejo et al., supra note 62, at 7.
72 Smithfield, 191 F.3d at 523.
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notably favors administrative rather than civil or criminal action.73 The
prerogative tends to be focused on bringing the violator into compliance
rather than on punition, or restoration of the contaminated ecosystem. In
the case of citizen suits, all civil penalties awarded by a court are paid to
the government; citizen plaintiffs have no right to monetary damages
under the CWA.74
F. STANDING
Achieving an adequate civil remedy in an environmental protection
suit can be difficult, as can collecting on a judgment. However, many
environmental suits are never tried on their merits: such cases can run
into problems of justiciability, particularly in terms of standing. Prior to
the 1990s, environmental cases enjoyed a broader view of standing. But
with the evolution of the injury-in-fact standard, particularly in terms of
its application to environmental litigation, standing has become a signifi-
cant hurdle for lawyers bringing legal action to protect the
environment.75
Historically, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (Lujan II)76 marked a
dramatic shift in standing jurisprudence. As an issue of first impression,
the Court considered standing under a citizen suit provision.77 Although
many believed that citizen suits overrode the necessity of showing an
injury-in-fact,78 the Court in Lujan II affirmed otherwise on the basis that
standing’s constitutional grounding necessitated an injury-in-fact.79 The
majority opinion set in place a stricter standard than it had ever before
applied to environmental plaintiffs; as a result of Lujan II “an individual
standing witness must [now] demonstrate that the behavior of a defen-
dant directly affects a tangible, personal interest. It is not enough to al-
lege an attenuated interest more diffusely defined . . .”80
73 Nicholas J. Nastasi and Jennifer A. DeRose, Federal Environmental Law: Criminal En-
forcement, ASS’N OF CORP. COUNS. (Feb. 1, 2012) http://m.acc.com/legalresources/quickcounsel/
felce.cfm.
74 OHIO ENVTL. COUNCIL, GUIDE TO CLEAN WATER ACTS CITIZEN SUITS 10 (last visited Mar.
19, 2018), https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/water_issues/programs/swamp/docs/cwt/guidance/112a1
.pdf.
75 Ann E. Carlson, Standing for the Environment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 931, 938 (1998).
76 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
77 Cf. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n (Lujan I), 497 U.S. 871 (1990); See 45 UCLA L. REV.
931, n.90.
78 Injury-in-fact is defined as “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete
and particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Kerchner v.
Obama, 669 F. Supp. 2d 477, 481 (D.N.J. 2009) (quoting Lujan II, 504 U.S. at 560).
79 504 U.S. 555.
80 45 UCLA L. REV., at 950.
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For the Pilgrim’s case, the standing standard for citizen suits under
the CWA is no different. A “citizen,” for the purposes of a citizen suit
under § 505(a) of the Act, is defined as “a person or persons having an
interest which is or may be adversely affected.”81 This language can be
read as codifying the injury-in-fact standard into the Act. The Court has
held that “environmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury-in-fact when
they aver that they use the affected area and are persons ‘for whom the
aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened’ by the chal-
lenged activity.”82
Thus, the complaint in the Pilgrim’s suit takes pains to qualify the
“members” of the plaintiffs’ group. The named plaintiffs, Environment
America, Inc. and the Sierra Club, are both national non-profit environ-
mental conservation organizations. However, a plaintiff, as a national
non-profit environmental organization, may not have standing alone. The
Sierra Club certainly knows this fact, as it once attempted to establish
that, as an organization, it had standing to sue as itself.83 In Sierra Club
v. Morton, the Sierra Club argued that its “longstanding concern with
and expertise in [environmental] matters were sufficient to give it stand-
ing as a ‘representative of the public,’” and “specifically declined to rely
on its individualized interest as a basis for standing.”84 But that argument
was unsuccessful.
Here, Environment America, Inc. a Colorado corporation, operates
under the name “Environment Florida”; Sierra Club, a California organi-
zation, with an office in Fort White, Florida, in addition to the number of
its Florida Chapter’s members—some of which are from the Suwannee
area.85 To bolster the legitimacy of their standing, the plaintiffs assert
that some of their members “live, own homes, or spend time near the
[Live Oak] plant and/or the Suwannee River, and . . . participate in recre-
ational activities in, on, or near the Suwannee River downstream of the
plant.”86 The complaint further elaborates: “[plaintiffs’ members] swim,
canoe, kayak, dive, fish, view wildlife, take walks, conduct research, bi-
cycle, boat, and engage in other activities on, in, and by the Suwannee
81 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(a), (g).
82 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc.,120 S. Ct. 693, 705 (2000); Nat.
Res. Def. Council v. Sw. Marine, Inc., 236 F.3d 985, 994 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972).).
83 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (affirming the dismissal of the Sierra Club’s
suit to stop the Disney corporation from developing a secluded natural valley into a major ski
resort.).
84 Id. at 735 n.8.
85 Plaintiff’s Complaint at 4, Env’t Am. v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., (2017) (No. 3:17-cv-00272-
TJC-JRK).
86 Id. at 5.
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River and its springs downstream of the plant.”87 This section of the
complaint concludes by listing nine paragraphs of harm suffered by
plaintiffs’ members, from the lessening of enjoyment of recreation activi-
ties, to fears about eating fish caught in the River.88 This description is
necessary to establish standing under the CWA—not just any concerned
citizen can enact a citizen suit.
G. OTHER PROBLEMS WITH STANDING
Another obstacle for citizen suits is that plaintiffs must give sixty-
days’ notice to the EPA, the state, and the alleged violator before suing.89
The Court’s purpose in notifying the alleged violator “is to give it an
opportunity to bring itself into complete compliance with the Act and
thus . . . render unnecessary a citizen suit.”90 Certainly, this notification
requirement is not unreasonable; it is intended to minimize the burden on
a crowded court system. But it often allows violators to strategically
sweep the rug out from under citizens, so to speak. In general, regulated
industries want to avoid CWA citizen suits, which can cost significantly
more than enforcement actions by regulatory agencies.91 If a violator
suddenly ceases its “exceedances,” or reports that it has, concerned citi-
zens can be left powerless to address the damage of the past violations;
they must rely on the government and trust in its “discretion.”92
Thus, even when the government has created protections for the en-
vironment and built provisions to empower citizens to participate in their
enforcement, pollution occurs and the environment degrades. Irrespec-
tive of designations like “Special Waters,” and hyperbole about “ecologi-
cal value” and “highest protections,” the federal and state governments
have repeatedly failed to adequately abate the problem of the industrial
defiling of America’s waters. Regulations like the CWA and NPDES
permits fail to deter violator-industrialists from environmentally-destruc-
tive practices. Violations are met with notices and administrative orders
that drag on, and citizen attempts to pick up the government’s slack are
met by many obstacles. As the current federal government seeks to re-
87 Id. at 40.
88 Id. at 41.
89 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A).
90 Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987).
91 OHIO ENVTL. COUNCIL, GUIDE TO CLEAN WATER ACTS CITIZEN SUITS 6 (last visited Mar.
19, 2018), https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&
uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwj2_PeRnIXXAhVIzGMKHXH5B34QFggtMAI&url=https%3A%2F%2F
www.waterboards.ca.gov%2Fwater_issues%2Fprograms%2Fswamp%2Fdocs%2Fcwt%2Fguidance
%2F112a1.pdf&usg=AOvVaw0r4RzHbsRy8q9Xv9dT0abt.
92 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2).
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peal environmental protections and deflate the EPA in favor of deregula-
tion and big business, who will protect America’s weary waterways?
III. THE COLORADO
From mountainous heights stream the source-waters of the Colorado
River.93 Delivered downward on the American southwest from the Con-
tinental Divide in Colorado’s Rocky Mountains, the Colorado River cuts
its way through seven American states toward the Gulf of California.94
Its course carves 1,450 miles through canyons, buttes, mesas, and gorges,
providing for the Colorado’s epic, photogenic backcloths.95 Before the
construction of the many dams that modernly sap its course, the Colo-
rado fed one of the largest desert estuaries on the planet.96 Even now, the
watershed spans eight percent of the continental United States.97 Conse-
quently, the traditional power and abundance of the Colorado’s life-giv-
ing presence in the arid expanses of the southwest have made it the
lifeline of the region.98
But the Colorado’s moniker, “the hardest-working river in the
west,” understates the strain it endures: it bears the burden of “over-allo-
cation, over-use, and more than a century of manipulation.”99 It is the
most-litigated and most-regulated river in America, maybe even the
world; while there are others more sizable, “no other river is more di-
vided and overused.”100
A. THE TRIUMPH OF POLITICIANS AND ENGINEERS
More water is diverted from the Colorado River Basin than from
any other watershed in America—Los Angeles, San Diego, Phoenix,
Tucson, Denver, Tijuana, Mexicali, and Las Vegas are all dependent on
its waters.101 To invoke the words of scholar Philip L. Fradkin: “The
93 Colorado River Basin, DESERT USA, https://www.desertusa.com/colorado/coloriv/
du_coloriv.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2018).
94 APRIL R. SUMMITT, CONTESTED WATERS: AN ENVTL. HISTORY OF THE COLO. RIVER X,
Boulder: University Press of Colorado (2013); Colorado River AMERICAN RIVERS, https://www
.americanrivers.org/river/colorado-river/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2018).
95 Colorado River, AMERICAN RIVERS, https://www.americanrivers.org/river/colorado-river/
(last visited Jan. 15, 2018).
96 Colorado River, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/en
try/Colorado_River (last visited Jan. 15, 2018).
97 AMERICAN RIVERS, supra note 95.
98 SUMMITT, supra note 94, at 4.
99 NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 96.
100 SUMMITT, supra note 94, at X.
101 PHILIP L. FRADKIN, A RIVER NO MORE: THE COLO. RIVER AND THE WEST 42 (1996);
SUMMITT, supra note 94, at X.
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complex of dams, reservoirs, tunnels, and canals spreading from the Col-
orado River system to embrace much of the West has become the most
complicated plumbing system in the world.”102
While seven major dams straddle its main channel, in addition to
dozens more scattered astride the Colorado’s tributaries, it is the Hoover
Dam that stands most prominently and with the most renown.103 It sym-
bolizes both “the successful joining of federal power and individual inge-
nuity,” and “the human ability to control nature, to harness a river.”104 At
the time of its completion in 1936, the Hoover Dam was the largest con-
crete structure ever built, as well as the tallest and biggest dam on the
planet.105 Today, the Hoover Dam’s gigantic turbines churn over four
billion kilowatt-hours of electricity from the Colorado’s waters each year
to keep large sections of California, Nevada, and Arizona alight.106
The Morelos Dam, located about three hundred miles below the
Hoover Dam, diverts flow to irrigate farms across the Mexican border.107
This lower section of the Colorado, officially designated as the “Lower
Colorado River” (Lower Colorado), begins upstream in Arizona; it is
where the River is most “bottled up and sucked dry by agriculture and
municipal demand.”108 The Colorado River is one of the world’s few
rivers that regularly dries up before reaching the salty seawaters of its
natural destination.109 The Lower Colorado currently holds the number
one position on the America’s Most-Endangered River Report for
2017.110 This fact is greatly disconcerting considering that the “Lower
Colorado River provides drinking water for one in ten Americans . . . and
grows approximately 90 percent of the nation’s winter vegetables.”111
Part of the problem is that the Lower Colorado Basin consumes a
yearly deficit, on average, of approximately 1.2 million more acre-feet of
water than it receives from the Upper Basin, which is sucked unsustain-
ably from water supplies accumulated when demand was lower.112 Al-
102 FRADKIN, supra note 101, at 42.
103 SUMMITT, supra note 94, at IX.
104 Id.
105 Id. at IX, 3.
106 Id. at IX.
107 Id.
108 AMERICAN RIVERS, supra note 95.
109 AMERICAN RIVERS, supra note 95; but see Sandra Postel, A Sacred Reunion: The Colo-
rado River Returns to the Sea, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC: WILDLIFE AND WILDPLACES (May 9, 2014),
https://voices.nationalgeographic.org/2014/05/19/a-sacred-reunion-the-colorado-river-returns-to-the-
sea/.
110 America’s Most Endangered River Report 2017, https://s3.amazonaws.com/american-rive
rs-website/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/11121018/MER2017_FinalFullReport_04062017.pdf.
111 Id. at 3.
112 Id. at 3-4.
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though recent attempts to address this issue have seen some success, the
Most-Endangered Report has warned that the looming menace of
drought endures and may intensify.113
B. THE LAW OF THE RIVER
The close of 2017 brings the ninety-fifth anniversary of the signing
of the Colorado River Compact.114 This agreement, signed November
24, 1922, has become known as the “keystone” of the swollen body of
law governing the Colorado River.115 The Compact allocates waters for
the River’s seven basin states: Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, New Mexico,
Nevada, Arizona, and California.116
By dividing these states into different groups, the Compact allocates
a collective consumptive use of 7.5 million acre feet (MAF) of water per
year to each group, which is then apportioned among its states.117 The
figures used to tabulate this allocation were based on hydrologic data
from the federal Reclamation Bureau that indicated an annual average
flow of 16.4 MAF. But the data varies over time because the Colorado’s
flow has never been consistent, ranging from 4.4 MAF to over 22 MAF
per year; the average flow has actually been millions of acre feet less
than the Compact’s commissioners presumed.118 Despite suggestions
that it should be renegotiated after fifty years, the Compact’s allocation
was made in perpetuity; its figures continue to be the basis for consump-
tion of the Colorado River’s waters.119
But the negotiation of the Compact was only the beginning: battles
over the Colorado have been fought within and without the houses of
Congress, internationally, and all the way up to the Supreme Court. No-
table developments include the “largest water settlement in U.S. history,”
when in 2004, the Gila River Indian Community finally gained con-
firmed water rights after a struggle lasting more than a century.120 Also,
113 See id.
114 Joe Gelt, Sharing Colorado River Water: History, Public Policy, and the Colorado River
Compact, WATER RESOURCES RES. CTR. (Aug. 1997), https://wrrc.arizona.edu/publications/arroyo-
newsletter/sharing-colorado-river-water-history-public-policy-and-colorado-river.
115 Id.
116 Greg Hobbs, Jr. History of Colorado River Law, Development and Use: A Primer and a
Look Forward 3 (2005) http://scholar.law.colorado.edu/hard-times-on-colorado-river/?utm_source=
scholar.law.colorado.edu%2Fhard-times-on-colorado-river%2F2&utm_medium=PDF&utm_cam
paign=PDFCoverPages; Law of the River COLO. RIVER WATER USERS ASS’N, https://www.crwua
.org/colorado-river/uses/law-of-the-river (last visited Jan. 15, 2018).
117 COLO. RIVER WATER USERS ASS’N, supra note 116.
118 Gelt, supra note 114.
119 Hobbs, supra note 116, at 4; Col. River Compact Article III(a). https://www.usbr.gov/lc/
region/pao/pdfiles/crcompct.pdf.
120 SUMMITT, supra note 94, at 161.
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in one of the longest U.S. Supreme Court cases in history, Arizona bat-
tled California over whether water from the Gila River (one of the Colo-
rado’s tributaries) would count as part of Arizona’s annual allotment.121
This extensive legislative and litigative history demonstrates the
centrality of the Colorado River to human livelihood—yet its epic legal
chronicle also displays a consistent ignorance to the livelihood of the
River itself. Generations of battling communities and governments have
always posited the River as the object of the litigation. The Colorado
itself—as a system, as an entity—has eternally stood outside the court-
room doors while its fate has been mulled and wrought without any con-
sideration for its own wellbeing or survival. Now, with increasing
concerns about the failure of the traditional legal system to address issues
of environmental degradation, a new movement is swelling, pushing for
a shift in legal consciousness to recognize the River itself as plaintiff of
the litigation.
C. COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEM VERSUS STATE AND GOVERNOR
On September 25, 2017, a lawsuit was filed in federal district court
in the name of the Colorado River Ecosystem.122 The suit seeks declara-
tory and injunctive relief against the State and Governor of Colorado for:
(1) the recognition of the Colorado River Ecosystem’s constitutional per-
sonhood; (2) recognition of the Ecosystem’s fundamental rights; (3)
equal protection of those rights; and (4) the enjoining of the State from
failing in its duty to recognize those rights, and thereby violating those
rights.123 In addition to the Ecosystem, the plaintiff party includes “next
friends”: an environmental group and local citizens with a strong connec-
tion to the ecosystem, whom the suit proposes to serve as the Ecosys-
tem’s legal voice.
The plaintiffs’ group of this suit resembles that of the Pilgrim’s citi-
zen suit. Both suits have been brought by environmental groups, com-
posed of citizen-members at both the national and local level, to protect
the rivers from ruin. However, River Ecosystem posits a new legal per-
spective that it argues is necessary “to avert collapse” because “[t]he
dominance of a culture that defines Nature as property enables its
destruction.”124
121 Id. at 156; see Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
122 Col. River Ecosystem v. State, No. 1:17-cv-02316-NYW (D. Col. filed Sept. 25, 2017).
123 See Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Col. River Ecosystem v. State (filed Nov. 3, 2017)
(No. 1:17-cv-02316-NYW), *throughout the discussion reference will be to the Amended Complaint
rather than the Original Complaint.
124 Id. at 19.
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D. PLAINTIFF COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEM
The idea of suing in the name of a natural system is foreign to the
American Legal System. So, to meet the demands of legal exactitude and
functionality, the complaint does not refer to “the River,” but instead to
“the Ecosystem.” Because a river is only an artery of a greater watershed
drainage system, this broader nomenclature is more appropriate and
workable. The Ecosystem is the approximate 246,000 square mile area
“bound by the high points and ridge lines where drop-by-drop and grain-
by-grain, water, sediment, and dissolved materials ebb their way towards
the Gulf of California.”125
Although the idea of a lawsuit by a natural entity presumes fanciful
hypotheticals wherein blades of grass sue gardeners, etc., the definition
of the Ecosystem offered in the complaint is more legally-feasible than
even its rational critics may imagine. An ecosystem may be indefinably
expansive in its reaches, but that does not make it invisible. The major
avenues and arteries of its passage are clear enough, and fundamental to
the lives—animal, plant, and human—that exist within its province.
E. NEXT FRIENDS AND THE RIVERKEEPER
The complaint proffers the human parties of the plaintiffs’ group as
“next friends,” or guardians, of the Ecosystem. They represent “the
human part . . . capable of speaking through words on behalf of the natu-
ral communities that comprise the Colorado River Ecosystem.”126 The
term “next friend” is traditionally used in the legal context to refer to the
person through whom an infant or juvenile maintains or defends a suit in
the absence of a guardian. It has also been employed creatively in the
contexts of elder law, habeas corpus, and military/terrorism prisoner
cases as well.127 The complaint describes the next friends, who were cho-
sen “to facilitate the Ecosystem’s appearance in court,” in a manner akin
to the description given of the plaintiffs’ group in Pilgrim’s.128
Like the plaintiffs in Pilgrim’s, the members of Deep Green Resis-
tance, the next friends, reside at various locations along the River or have
some articulable connection to the Ecosystem. However, the next friends
are not qualified in terms of their relationship to the Ecosystem in quite
125 Id. at 3.
126 Id. at 10.
127 See Allison K. Hoffman, Reimagining the Risk of Long-Term Care, 16 YALE J. HEALTH
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 147 (2016); Tracy Bateman Farrell, Next-Friend Standing for Purposes of Bring-
ing Federal Habeas Corpus Petition, 5 A.L.R. FED. 2D 427; Caroline Nasrallah Belk, Note: Next
Friend Standing and the War on Terror, 53 DUKE L.J. 1747 (2004).
128 River Ecosystem Complaint, supra note 123, at 10.
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the same detail as the plaintiffs in Pilgrim’s; not as much effort is dedi-
cated to establishing a direct harm (i.e. an injury-in-fact) to individual
humans because the next friends concept proposes an evolution of the
standing standard for environmental cases. Instead, the next friends are
offered as guardians “bound to act in [the Ecosystem’s] best interests and
to advocate for [its] inherent and constitutionally-secured rights.”129 This
role is held up as an application of the guardian ad litem, who serves as a
legally-appointed protector of a child or a person who has a disability.
In River Ecosystem, the next friends concept offers a loosening of
the standing standard to (a) give prominence to the injury of the environ-
mental system itself, and (b) free plaintiffs’ groups from the potentially-
fatal burden of having to articulate a direct human harm. Rather than
seeking plaintiffs with very specific facts to fit into the narrow field of
what qualifies as proper to establish standing, the next friends guardian-
ship allows for the election of agents who may have less of a qualifiable
“injury,” but who may nonetheless have a more qualified relationship
with the environmental system to be represented. For example, in addi-
tion to the members of Deep Green Resistance, the next friends also in-
clude Owen Lammers and John Weisheit. Mr. Lammers is described as
the Executive Director of Living Rivers, an advocacy group working “to
realize social-ecological balance with the Colorado River Watershed.”130
The complaint states that Mr. Lammers has held this position for almost
twenty years.131
D. John Weisheit is the 63-year-old “Riverkeeper” who “has en-
joyed the Colorado and its tributaries since childhood . . . Mr. Weisheit
began his training as a professional river guide in 1980 and continues to
lead river trips that support scientific research and public education.”132
Mr. Weisheit has also published a long-researched book about canyon-
land rivers.133
The traditional injury-in-fact standard creates significant obstacles
for plaintiffs in environmental suits. It also serves to reinforce the dan-
gerous idea that Nature is property by blurring the judicial lens from the
recognition that the interests and wellbeing of ecosystems are justiciable.
Even the citizen suit provisions built in to environmental statutes like the
CWA are hampered by this human-centered standing approach. But the
next friend designation allows qualified individuals with specialized
129 Id. at 11.
130 River Ecosystem Complaint, supra note 123, at 16.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 16, 19.
133 Id. at 16.
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knowledge and skills tailored to the interests of the natural system to
stand for its rights without having to allege a particularized injury.
This idea of overcoming the standing standard by placing Nature
itself as a plaintiff in a lawsuit is not a new one. Despite the decision of
the unconvinced majority, Sierra Club v. Morton did yield one notable
upshot for environmentalists: in his dissent, Justice Douglas gave
credence to the revolutionary notion that the resource itself should be
granted standing.134
F. THE LONE JUSTICE STANDING WITH THE TREES
The notion rooted in Douglas’ dissent had been presented in an arti-
cle published just a few months before titled Should Trees Have Stand-
ing?135 In that article, law professor Christopher Stone proposed that, as
human evolution has gradually given to an expansion of those with rights
under the law, a further expansion of the law is possible to convey rights
to natural systems, like a river, or, as it was in Sierra Club v. Morton, a
valley.136
In fact, the law already conveys rights to other inanimate entities,
such as trusts, corporations, and municipalities.137 Stone ventured that
while the idea may sound absurd, at one time so did the idea of giving
rights to women; the current legal notion of property looks to the natural
world as “objects for man to conquer and use—in such the same way as
the law once looked upon ‘man’s’ relationship to African Negroes.”138
Stone’s article proffered a glimpse into how such a system would func-
tion, claiming that in some ways the legal system has already begun to
develop the necessary mechanisms (such as guardianship, and class ac-
tions for injuries diffused over a large group).139 He declared that con-
ceptually, such a legal sea-change is necessary to re-adjust awareness
about humanity’s relationship to the environment. This idea is at the
foundation of “resource-centered” standing, and can be contrasted with
the current and traditional human-centered approach.
Although Stone’s article and Douglas’ dissent were written almost a
half-century ago, there has been little development of the “standing for
nature” idea since then. Except for a few sporadic articles reviving the
134 Sierra Club, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), see supra note 83, at 741.
135 CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING?: AND OTHER ESSAYS ON LAW,
MORALS, AND THE ENV’T, (25th Anniversary Ed. 1996).
136 Id.
137 Id. at 3.
138 Id. at 12.
139 Id. at 7.
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notion for the purpose of academic debate, the idea has remained outside
American halls of justice—until now.
G. STANDING, AS IT STANDS TODAY
Modernly, scholars speak of globalist standing, as exemplified by
the cases before the era of Lujan II, and localist standing, the current
standard, which places an intensively individualistic focus on the plain-
tiff’s injury-in-fact. In her article Standing for the Environment,140 Ann
Carlson makes an interesting argument that, while many enviro-litigators
lament the change in Lujan II, the heightened standard can influence
litigation strategies to focus more on the human implications of environ-
mental degradation. Carlson describes it as “a chance to establish a
stronger connection between humans and the natural environment and
thus do more for long-lasting environmental protection than can be ac-
complished through any single legal victory.”141
Scholars and lawyers like Stone, however, would argue that this
human-centered perspective blinds the law to some of Nature’s injuries
that those human persons who do have standing cannot or will not ade-
quately represent. In Should Trees Have Standing, Stone provides a num-
ber of examples: “even if a plaintiff riparian wins a water pollution suit
for damages, no money goes to the stream itself to repair its damages . . .
even if the jurisdiction issues an injunction . . . there is nothing to stop
the plaintiffs from selling out the stream, i.e. agreeing to dissolve or not
enforce the injunction at some price,” as Judge Learned Hand might en-
courage them to do.142 Stone argued that “a serious reconsideration of
our consciousness towards the environment” is necessary, and it is
through the Supreme Court and the legal system as a way to inculcate
society.143 Those are words of decades ago, and the legal system is only
now at the outset of an opportunity to consider the Standing for Nature
doctrine’s merits.
H. THE LEGAL BASIS
River Ecosystem centers on a group of human representatives suing
on behalf of the ecosystem composing the Colorado River. The suit al-
leges the state government has failed to recognize the Ecosystem’s
rights, and that it continues to create and pursue policy that contributes to
140
 Ann E. Carlson, Standing for the Environment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 931 (1998).
141 Id. at 1004.
142 STONE, supra note 135, at 11.
143 STONE, supra note 135, at 36.
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the Ecosystem’s demise. First, the suit asks the federal district court to
declare the Ecosystem a legal person. Upon a determination of the
Ecosystem’s personhood, the suit seeks the recognition of the Ecosys-
tem’s rights, so that the court may then acknowledge the State’s violation
of those rights. Finally, the suit begs the court’s protection from further
governmental violation by compelling the State to recognize the Ecosys-
tem’s rights.
The plaintiff contends the court has the authority to grant this rem-
edy through the function of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2201, which states that
any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate plead-
ing, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested
party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could
be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a
final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.144
This statute does not confer jurisdiction, so the lawsuit also invokes di-
versity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (the Colorado’s waters
cannot be said to reside in only one state;), as well as federal question
subject matter under § 1331, and original jurisdiction under § 1343, sub-
section (a)(3) of which is specifically used
[t]o redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity
secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Con-
gress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States.145
The use of this subsection is important because (1) of course, the State
and Governor are the defendants, and (2) the very purpose of the suit is
to establish the personhood and rights of the Colorado River Ecosystem
under the U.S. Constitution. This statute establishes the jurisdiction of
U.S. district courts over “any civil action authorized by law to be com-
menced by any person,” to recover for the deprivation of any right, and
this subsection is designed for instances where a government actor is the
cause of that deprivation.146
144 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). Also notable is the statutory language qualifying that a party’s rights
may be declared “whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” This feature reveals the design
of the statute to operate commonly as a summary proceeding in cases of undisputed facts or solely
questions of law. See Advisory Notes.
145 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (emphasis added).
146 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(1).
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For the court to be able to give declaratory relief under § 2201,
there must be “a case of actual controversy.”147 The statute takes this
language directly from the U.S. Constitution.148 Courts, in the context of
this statute, have interpreted those words to mean that the controversy
must be “of a justiciable nature.”149 If the court finds that an actual con-
troversy exists, “[t]he existence or nonexistence of any right, duty,
power, liability, privilege, disability, or immunity or of any fact upon
which such legal relations depend, or of a status, may be declared.”150
The complaint asserts that there is an actual case and controversy,
and legal uncertainty, as to whether the Colorado River Ecosystem is a
legal person and thereby has inherent rights protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.151 The complaint defines the
Ecosystem’s inherent rights as the “right to exist, the right to flourish, the
right to regenerate, the right to be restored, and the right to naturally
evolve.”152 In this way, the litigation strategy to protect the Colorado is
radically different from the traditional citizen-suit model, like that being
used in the attempted protection of the Suwannee.
Here, the Ecosystem becomes more than an object—it becomes an
actual party to the suit and a legal actor speaking directly to the court for
the recognition of its own standing and rights. In River Ecosystem, a win
means the Ecosystem’s entitlement to legal status, so that it may litigate
for its own protection, whereas in Pilgrim’s, a win means the govern-
ment-set limits on toxic discharges will be enforced. The difference be-
tween both the legal posture and potential results of the two different
suits is staggering, and reflects the gap in modern jurisprudence and so-
cial consciousness about the value of Nature—and its role in sustaining
the human economy.
The complaint frames the issue as the need for the Ecosystem to
protect itself, because “[t]hreats to the Colorado River Ecosystem are
threats to life.”153 This stance is in stark contrast with the traditional legal
notion that the Earth is property, or at best, that the environment is pas-
sive and must be protected from human encroachment by paternalistic
legislation. The major problem with this latter approach has always been
where to draw the line: the fine balance between limiting environmental
degradation without hindering industry.
147 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
148 U.S. CONST. art. III.
149 Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 325 (1936).
150 USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 57 Notes of Advisory Committee. *FRCP 57 governs the
procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
151 River Ecosystem Complaint, supra note 123, at 27.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 25.
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History has shown that governments and the law have failed to safe-
guard the environment upon which civilization depends. In a system that
has so much hope, trust, and reliance on the mechanical wrenching of the
adversarial push-and-pull to extract justice, perhaps it is only logical that
Nature be given the power to advocate for itself—especially when its
foremost historical enemies, governments and corporations, yield so
much legal force.
I. THE AMENDMENTS AND JURIDICAL PERSONHOOD
The Petition Clause of the First Amendment protects the right to
petition a court for the redress of grievances. The Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that the government
shall not deprive any person of “life, liberty, or property.” Because a lack
of legal recognition violates its due process and petition rights, the plain-
tiff contends that the Colorado River Ecosystem should be recognized as
a “person” as the word is used in the Constitution.154 This effort towards
establishing juridical personhood for the Ecosystem is the first step to-
wards having its rights legally acknowledged and enforced. This point is
where the crux of the litigation lies: if the plaintiff is unable to persuade
the court that the Ecosystem should be considered a legal person, the
claims for the recognition of its rights will fail.
But while the idea of a non-human entity as a “person” may seem
strange to the average American, lawyers and jurists (and boardroom ex-
ecutives) have long been familiar with the idea.  In fact, modern law
holds many examples of the attribution of constitutional rights to “non-
natural” entities, just as it holds examples of the historical denial of the
rights of some groups of natural persons (e.g. women, slaves, etc.). The
most prominent example of a non-natural legal person is that ubiquitous
actor, the hero and villain of modern times: the Corporation.
J. CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE TOO
Corporate personhood stems from a rationale of economic effi-
ciency, but has since germinated into a broader philosophy legitimizing
the continued expansion of corporate rights under a theory of aggrega-
tion.155 Under this modern theory, corporations derive their own separate
154 Id.
155 See James G. Wright III, A Step Too Far: Recent Trends in Corporate Personhood and
the Overexpansion of Corporate Rights, 49 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 889, 890 (2016); Brendan F. Pons,
The Law and Philosophy of Personhood: Where Should South Dakota Abortion Law Go From
Here?, 58 S.D. L. REV. 119, 140 (2013).
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rights from the aggregation of the human individuals of which they are
comprised.156 Although the idea of corporations existing as legal entities
with the ability to contract, to sue, and to own property is relatively an-
cient, our modern conception of the “corporate person” is distinct in that
now corporations are afforded constitutional rights extending beyond the
mere practicality of economic function.157 Indeed, it has been observed
that the modern “Court takes the notion of [corporate] ‘personhood’ quite
literally, attempting to expand the rights of corporations to equal that of
natural persons.”158
K. THE GROUNDS UPON WHICH THE CORPORATE PERSON STANDS
Corporate personhood is the notion that the U.S. Constitution “pro-
vides for equal identity between corporations and persons.”159 The
evolution of corporate personhood in modern American jurisprudence
has manifested expansions in unanticipated ways, leading scholars to ob-
serve that, “corporate personhood is quicksilver; it seems an endlessly
adaptable concept.”160
The increase in the legal clout of corporations has had the parallel
effect of contributing to environmental degradation. Because the greatest
polluters are industrial, the continuing expansion of the rights of corpo-
rate persons empowers these super-human aggregates, whose destructive
activities are exponential in force. Lawsuits to protect natural areas are
often against corporate defendants, brought by environmental groups and
concerned citizens. But because the legal system has developed along-
side economic expansion, business interests often trump those of con-
cerned environmentalists, especially when it comes to standing
requirements.
And so, behemoth industrialists like JBS not only have increased
resources and capital, but they also enjoy a legal status that affords them
156 Wright III, supra note 155, at 890-91.
157 Gwendolyn Gordon, Environmental Personhood, 15-16, SSRN (March 7, 2017) https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2935007.
158 Wright III, supra note 155, at 908. The contemporary Court’s view seems in close concur-
rence with Mitt Romney’s famous quip to hecklers during the 2011 presidential campaign: see
Ashley Parker, ‘Corporations Are People,’ Romney Tells Iowa Hecklers Angry Over His Tax Policy
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2011) http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/12/us/politics/12romney.html.
159 Nick J. Sciullo, Reassessing Corporate Personhood in the Wake of Occupy Wall Street, 22
WIDENER L.J. 611, 642-643 (2013).
160 Gordon, supra note 157, at 2. And yet it the Court was never doubtful that a corporation
could be considered a legal person: “The court does not wish to hear argument on the question
whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these corpora-
tions. We are all of opinion that it does.” Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. P. R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 397 (1886).
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a variety of legal tools with which to lobby and litigate against environ-
mental protections, and to wage their defense against suits to expose and
prosecute their pollutive malfeasance. Governments, like that of the State
of Colorado, often defer to the interests of big business on environmental
matters, cooperating under the seduction of economic, infrastructure, and
employment gains. American history has seen governments with varying
degrees of alignment and deference to the corporate infringement of Na-
ture’s rights, some with less, some with more, but consistently and re-
gardless of administrative policy, the laws and courts of the United States
have failed to safeguard the natural ecosystems of America.
IV. THE NECESSARY EVOLUTION
The waters of the Suwannee are, by government acknowledgement,
exceptionally pure and vital. The flow of the Colorado is undeniably epic
and crucial: with it, millions of thirsts are quenched, crops irrigated, and
the electricity of several metropolises fueled. The Suwannee is a target of
neighboring water-scarce municipalities. The Colorado has been
dammed and diverted so many times now that its waters rarely reach
their oceanic destination. It is common to think of these victims as iso-
lated bodies of a landscape, or azure veins on a map. But these units of
water are actually pieces of elaborate ecosystems upon which the lives
and the ultimate livelihood of American civilization depend.
The purpose of law is to promote and safeguard the health, welfare,
and safety of a society. The role of government is to uphold and execute
the law. But the government and the law have miscarried the value of
natural ecosystems. Even with the legislated protection of agencies like
the EPA, the degrative effect of regulated human activity on natural sys-
tems has been visibly profound. The EPA has shown itself to be insuffi-
cient, yet courts defer to its jurisdiction, presuming it will manage things
appropriately. But the EPA tolerates exceedances and neglects to use the
full strength of its power for punition and deterrence. As a federal
agency, the EPA is subject to the ebbing policy whims of changing exec-
utives; the application of its powers and discretion have never been
consistent.
The Colorado is a foremost example of the failure of law and gov-
ernment to sustain a natural system. The extensive century of law-mak-
ing around the Colorado has focused almost exclusively on damming and
divvying up its flow. The legal battles that have been waged, including
the longest running U.S. Supreme Court case in history,161 have been
161 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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singularly-centered; apportionment between competing human groups
and needs is the unwavering, all-else-overshadowing concern.
But the short-sighted human needs of the past and present have ne-
glected to appreciate the living quality of the resources that have been
subjugated, sapped, and sullied in their service.  Rivers are pieces of in-
tricate ecosystems; ecosystems are living entities, and therefore can be
killed and eradicated. Modern American civilization, through its laws
and governments, has endorsed, supported, and upheld the despoilment
of the natural ecosystems under its jurisdiction—without adequate con-
sideration of their finite mortality. Therefore, those elements of Ameri-
can society endowed with the power and position to protect the
environment, have been and continue to be complicit in its destruction.
A. WHEN THE GOVERNMENT HAS FAILED TO PROTECT A RIVER, THE
ECOSYSTEM MUST BE ABLE TO PROTECT ITSELF
`A la base, Pilgrim’s and River Ecosystem are the same: they both
seek judicial remedy to the problem of a river’s ruin. Substantively, how-
ever, their legal approaches are vastly different. Pilgrim’s follows the
traditional model, as designed by Congress and enacted, for this context,
as the citizen suit provision of the CWA.
At best, the Pilgrim’s plaintiffs may win a court order forcing Pil-
grim’s to comply with the toxic discharge limits in its NPDES permit,
and “to refrain from further violations.”162 A court could also issue an
order obligating Pilgrim’s to “remedy, mitigate, or offset the harm
caused by [its] violations,” and issue a civil penalty against the corpora-
tion for each day of its violations. Superficially, existing law does em-
power a court to address the threefold objectives of punishment,
deterrence, and restoration. Nonetheless, past examples of (a) the EPA’s
regulation; (b) the historical pattern of court enforcement; in addition to
(c) the alarmingly continuous increase in ecological degradation nation-
wide since the EPA’s creation, have shown this avenue to be ineffectual.
Conversely, River Ecosystem proffers the opportunity for a legal
paradigm shift. Even as the potency of the EPA deflates, and the current
executive and lawmakers veer government policies far from environmen-
tal protection, a declaration of the Ecosystem’s rights by the judicial
branch could serve as a necessary check towards a balance of the type
intended by the Constitution’s framers. Such a declaration would not
only force businesses and governments to reconsider their treatment of
162 Plaintiff’s Complaint at 42, Env’t Am. v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., (2017) (No. 3:17-cv-
00272-TJC-JRK).
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(and attitudes toward) ecological resources—and the effects thereupon of
human (mainly economic) activities—but it would also set an important
precedent with which to evolve America’s legal consciousness. In a
country where less than a fifth of the rivers are officially considered
“good” and “healthy biological communities,” while the rest “can’t sup-
port healthy aquatic life,” that such an evolution is necessary seems self-
evident.163
Another difference between the Pilgrim’s model and that of River
Ecosystem, is the form of the human representatives standing for the re-
spective rivers. In Pilgrim’s, the conservationist groups leading the suit
sought out select individuals with whom some articulable relationship to
the river can be proved. This practice is widespread, and necessary, in
environmental litigation because of the particularized injury-in-fact re-
quirement of standing. As applied to citizen suits, a stringent injury-in-
fact standard creates a needless procedural obstacle. Congress explicitly
wrote citizen suit provisions into environmental regulations with the in-
tention of loosening standing obstacles in the environmental context; it
was the Court which tightened up the standard. Accordingly, the current
standing requirements in front of environmental suits could be overcome
by the Court’s expansion of juridical personhood to include natural
ecosystems.
A next friends-type designation would allow for more specialized
and motivated representatives, such as John Weisheit, River Ecosystem’s
designated “riverkeeper,” and Owen Lammers, another named next
friend in the suit. Respectively, these two represent (1) a hands-on, life-
time local inhabitant, with decades of experience navigating the waters,
and over twelve years of dedication to scientific research in the area; and
(2) an experienced organizer and activist focused on developing sustaina-
ble management policies within the region.
In contrast to the unique representatives conservation groups are
often forced to seek out to overcome the hurdle of standing, the next
friends concept opens courtroom doors to those holding great dedication
and experience with the ecosystem who may otherwise have trouble
showing a particularized injury. But this is not to say that just anyone
could file a lawsuit on behalf of an ecosystem because that could lead
163 Dashiell Bennett, Half of All U.S. Rivers Are Too Polluted for Our Health, THE ATLANTIC
(Mar. 27, 2013) https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/03/half-all-us-rivers-are-too-pol-
luted-our-health/316027/; see U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Survey Finds More Than
Half of the Nation’s River and Stream Miles in Poor Condition, WATER ONLINE (Mar. 26, 2013),
https://www.wateronline.com/doc/epa-survey-finds-half-nations-river-stream-miles-poor-condition-
0001.
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parties who exploit or over-use natural resources to also file like-named
lawsuits, with the furtive purpose of reducing protections.
The purpose of the next friends concept is not to eliminate the
standing requirement for environmental suits. Rather its objective is to
refine its adequacy: just as a guardian ad litem, in the family law con-
text, is appointed to serve “the best interest of the child,” so too would
the next friend be evaluated in terms of an ability to represent the “best
interests” of the Ecosystem, as adjudged by the court—through a lens
wider than that of the particularized injury-in-fact standard. That way,
more environmental cases could be heard and decided on their merits.
Moreover, because corporations are legal persons with expanded
constitutional rights, and because the greatest polluters are industrial, the
development of the legal system alongside economic expansion has
granted those superhuman aggregates of resource, capital, and political
influence a voice in the courts. When it comes to environmental laws,
that voice is most often heard either pushing for less limitations or de-
fending against allegations of causing harm.
V. CONCLUSION
On November 17, 2017, Pilgrim’s settled the lawsuit against it by
agreeing to pay $1.43 million in penalty fees. Some of that amount will
go to the federal and Florida state governments, but the greater part will
be paid to Stetson University to create a Sustainable Farming Fund,
which will be administered by the Institute for Water and Environmental
Resilience at the school.164 On November 7, ten days before the an-
nouncement of that settlement, the net income attributable to Pilgrim’s
Pride for the third-quarter of 2017 had increased from $98.66 million to
$232.68 million—a 230% increase.165
So, while the settlement contains provisions that appear to favor the
river, along with steps toward evolving the future environmental impacts
of agricultural practices, the result poses concerns about the prospect of
the Suwannee’s enduring purity. First, the allowance levels of the Pil-
grim’s plant’s NPDES permit still remain legal limits: about 1.5 million
164 Jamie Wachter, Pilgrim’s Pride Settles Water Pollution Lawsuit THE SUWANNEE DEMO-
CRAT (Nov. 16, 2017) http://www.suwanneedemocrat.com/news/pilgrim-s-pride-settles-water-pollu
tion-lawsuit/article_9c18e536-ca49-11e7-b4e0-37646c7f0746.html.
165 Pilgrim’s Pride Q3 Profit Rises, NASDAQ (Nov. 7, 2017) www.nasdaq.com/article/pil
grims-pride-q3-profit-rises-20171107-02068.
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gallons of wastewater from the processing plant are pumped into the
Suwannee River daily.166
Second, Pilgrim’s is exempted from its obligation to limit its plant’s
toxic discharges by purchasing new equipment and installations if the
discharge of wastewater into the Suwannee has been scheduled to be
eliminated through an alternative plan approved by the Florida Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection, prior to the deadlines set for compli-
ance.167 The same exemption applies to the obligation to pay penalties
from any future violation to the Farming Fund. Given the track record of
the Florida EPA’s leniency towards agri-business, this provision is not
encouraging.
Third, the penalty fees, described as “historic for the state [of Flor-
ida],” represent a mere 0.6 percent of the company’s net income for the
year’s 3rd quarter.168 That number speaks volumes about the state gov-
ernment’s attitude toward enforcement; in this case the state “had not
taken any meaningful action in well over 1,000 days of violations over
five years.”169 And so, while this settlement represents a victory for the
citizens who stepped in because their “state officials were not doing
enough to protect one of Florida’s most important rivers,”170 it also poses
an echoing query about what would have happened had the particular
facts of the case not so-easily supported the citizen-plaintiffs’ standing.
Meanwhile, less than a month later, on December 4, 2017, Magis-
trate Judge Nina Y. Wang of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Colorado issued an order dismissing plaintiff Colorado River Ecosys-
tem’s complaint with prejudice.171 The court order thereby granted the
plaintiff’s motion to dismiss its amended complaint; denied as moot the
defendant’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint; and directed the
Clerk of the Court to terminate the case.172 Approximately three weeks
earlier, on November 16, the Colorado Attorney General’s office had
sent a letter threatening that if the plaintiffs did not withdraw the case it
would file sanctions against Jason Flores-Williams, the attorney repre-
166 Eileen Kelley, Settlement proposed against Chicken-Processing Plant that Dumps into
Suwannee, NAT’L ENVTL. LAW CTR. (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.nelconline.org/settlement-pro
posed-lawsuit-against-chicken-processing-plant-dumps-suwannee-river.
167 Wachter, supra note 164 (emphasis added).
168 Kelley, supra note 166.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 See Order 12/4/17, Col. River Ecosystem v. State (2017) (No. 1:17-cv-02316-NYW).
172 Id.
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senting the Colorado River Ecosystem and its next friends.173 In the
plaintiff’s motion to dismiss its own complaint, Flores-Williams wrote:
The Complaint represented a good faith attempt to introduce the
Rights of Nature doctrine to our jurisprudence . . . The undersigned
[counsel for plaintiff] continues to believe that the doctrine provides
American courts with a pragmatic and workable tool for addressing
environmental degradation and the current issues facing the Colorado
River. That said, the expansion of rights is a difficult and legally com-
plex matter. When engaged in an effort of first impression, the under-
signed has a heightened ethical duty to continuously ensure that
conditions are appropriate for our judicial institution to best consider
the merits of a new canon. After respectful conferral with opposing
counsel per D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(A), Plaintiff respectfully moves
this Honorable Court to dismiss the Amended Complaint with
prejudice.174
Following the court’s order, Colorado Attorney General Cynthia
Coffman issued a statement saying the “Colorado River Ecosystem asked
for the dismissal after [her] office filed a motion to dismiss the amended
complaint.”175 But Attorney General Coffman’s statement did not men-
tion the threatened sanctions. Instead, it declared that the case “unaccept-
ably impugned the State’s sovereign authority to administer natural
resources for public use.”176 This argument, grounded in the Tenth
Amendment, is a common response against uses of the federal courts for
environmental protection.
However, the geographic and economic expanses of a single ecosys-
tem interweave the interests and fates of different communities and can-
not be said to fall, even in part, under the exclusive jurisdiction of one:
the Colorado’s watershed is domiciled in six different states, plus Mex-
ico. By the very nature of ecological interconnectivity, the health of
America’s ecosystems should be understood and addressed as a national
(i.e. federal) question. Nevertheless, because of the State’s threatened
sanctions against Flores-Williams, Attorney General Coffman’s claim
173 Lindsay Fendt, State Files Again to Dismiss Colorado River “Personhood” Suit, Threat-
ens to Sanction Lawyer, COYOTE GULCH (Dec. 4, 2017), https://coyotegulch.blog/2017/12/04/state-
files-again-to-dismiss-colorado-river-personhood-lawsuit-threatens-to-sanction-lawyer/.
174 Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss, Col. River Ecosystem v. State (2017) (No. 1:17-cv-02316-
NYW).
175 Chris Walker, Attorney to Withdraw Colorado River Lawsuit Under Threat of Sanctions,
WESTWORD (Dec. 4, 2017), http://www.westword.com/news/colorado-river-lawsuit-to-be-with
drawn-due-to-potential-sanctions-9746311.
176 Id.
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that the “case unacceptably impugned the State’s sovereign authority”
cannot be tested on its merits.
In her announcement, Attorney General Coffman observed that
“[u]nder the terms of dismissal, the case cannot be brought again in fed-
eral court.”177 Though it may be true that the terms of the dismissal pre-
clude the case from being brought again in federal court, this prejudice
only applies to the case’s plaintiffs; the dismissal does not prevent a dif-
ferent plaintiff from bringing a different suit to establish the same
doctrine.
So, while the Colorado River Ecosystem may be left unrecognized,
the merits of Ecosystem Personhood and the Rights for Nature doctrine
remain untried by an American court.  Flores-Williams wrote of the need
for appropriate “conditions” when bringing a case of first impression.
But environmental issues, particularly those related to water quality and
scarcity in the U.S., show no signs of abatement.
In response, a shift in consciousness is needed; juridical personhood
for the nation’s environmental systems could be the way to open such a
door. The administrative, economic, and legal systems of America are
structured with an inherent, fatal blindness to the wellbeing of the natural
systems that support them. Notions of property and apportionment, mea-
sured solely in terms of human benefits and injuries-in-fact, are not con-
ducive to the health and protection of the ecosystems that underpin our
civilization.
The legal recognition of ecosystem personhood not only widens the
scope of the types of injuries a court can determine, as concerns environ-
mental harm, but it also holds the potential to progress cultural attitudes
and begin inculcating a new social consciousness of the human relation-
ship with the environment. In the same way that the Court thrust a
change upon the American social landscape with its decision in Brown v.
Board of Education,178 so can it overcome staunched, destructive notions
again by recognizing the constitutional personhood, and inherent rights,
of the ecosystems within its jurisdiction: “a society in which it is stated,
however vaguely, that ‘rivers have legal rights’ would evolve a different
legal system than one which did not employ that expression, even if the
two of them had, at the start, the very same ‘legal rules’ in other re-
spects.”179 Yesterday, today, and tomorrow America, and the world,
stand at a turning point upon which the fate of the planet’s life-blood—
177 Id.
178 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that racial segregation in public
schools is unconstitutional).
179 STONE, supra note 135, at 33.
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and thereby the lives of its inhabitants and their economies—is
dependent.
Despite great resistance and apathy against the expansiveness of the
current environmental crises, the Court’s recognition of the rights of Na-
ture could re-orient the American legal system, and thereby American
society, setting forth the evolution of the nation in a new direction. Just
as Brown v. Board was followed by defiance, experimentation, success
and failure, ultimately the first step undertaken by the Warren Court in
recognizing the unconstitutionality of race-based school segregation led
to a fundamental change in the way subsequent generations of Americans
thought and behaved.  Such a step is crucially needed now, because the
right to flourish, regenerate, and evolve—although framed for an ecosys-
tem—is really the right to flourish, regenerate, and evolve American
civilization.
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